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Integrating Forest Carbon Sequestration into a Cap-and-Trade Program to
Reduce Net Carbon Emissions
Abstract
Problem: Most research on planning to mitigate climate change has focused on reducing CO2 emissions from
coal-fıred power plants or the transportation sector. The contribution of forests to lowering net CO2
emissions has largely been overlooked. U.S. forests already offset about one eighth of the nation's annual CO2
emissions and have the potential to offset more, all at a relatively low cost. It will not be easy to integrate forest
carbon sequestration into a cap-and-trade program to reduce net CO2 emissions, however. Purpose: I explore
what forest land use planning, forestry management practices, and land preservation strategies would be
required to integrate forest carbon sequestration into a cap-and- trade program, and explain the role planning
and planners can play in promoting forest carbon sequestration. Methods: The Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative is a 10-state cap-and-trade program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from coal-fıred power plants
in the northeastern United States. It provides a case study of how forest carbon sequestration can be included
in a cap-and-trade program. Meanwhile, California has devised certifiable carbon credits from forestland. I
analyze both approaches and generalize from them. Results and conclusions: To promote forest carbon
sequestration through a cap-and-trade program will require ensuring the permanence of CO2 reductions,
minimizing leakage from forestland conversion, and obtaining prices for carbon offsets that are high enough to
induce forestland owners to participate in the program and offer them for sale. The capital needed to purchase
and monitor permanent forest conservation easements as well as to provide a stream of annual income for
timberland owners may require a national system of carbon credits. Ideally, the easements would be set up in
advance through investments by government or non-profıts, so that landowners will be ready to sell credits
when they are demanded. Takeaway for practice: A cap-and-trade system could be a cost-effective way to
lower net CO2 emissions if it included certifiable, trade-able credits from forestland preservation and
management, and if the price of carbon credits were high enough to induce forest landowners to offer credits.
To promote forest carbon sequestration, planners in rural areas should work with the local, state, and federal
governments and non-profıt land trusts to zone forestland at low densities, to preserve forest land through
acquiring conservation easements, and to fashion forest management plans that ensure long cycles of timber
harvesting. Planners in metropolitan areas should promote tree planting and tree retention ordinances to
protect, expand, and manage urban forests to absorb greenhouse gases.
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Integrating Forest Carbon Sequestration into a Cap-and-Trade Program to Reduce 
Net Carbon Emissions 
 
Problem: Most research on planning to mitigate climate change has focused on reducing 
carbon dioxide emissions from coal-fired power plants or the transportation sector. The 
contribution of forests in lowering net carbon emissions has largely been overlooked. 
U.S. forests offset about one-eighth of the nation’s annual CO2 emissions and have the 
potential to offset more emissions, and at a relatively low cost. A main challenge is how 
to integrate forest carbon sequestration into a cap-and-trade program to reduce net CO2 
emissions.  
Purpose: To fill a gap in the research on planning to mitigate climate change that has 
focused heavily on lowering carbon emissions from coal-fired power plants and the 
transportation sector. To explore what forest land use planning, forestry management 
practices, and land preservation strategies would be required to integrate forest carbon 
sequestration into a cap-and- trade program. To explain the role of planning and planners 
in promoting forest carbon sequestration. 
Methods: The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative is a 10-state cap-and-trade program to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions from coal-fired power plants in the northeastern U.S. 
The Initiative provides a case study of how forest carbon sequestration is being included 
in a cap-and-trade program. Meanwhile, the State of California has devised certifiable 
carbon credits from forestland. Critical analyses of both the Initiative and carbon credit 
approach provide insight into the potential for cap-and-trade programs to promote forest 
carbon sequestration, and how land use planning, forest management plans, and 
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forestland preservation could broaden the role of carbon credits in a cap-and-trade 
program.  
Results and Conclusions: Promoting forest carbon sequestration through a cap-and-
trade program is not easy. Ensuring the permanence of CO2 reductions and minimizing 
leakage from forestland conversion are essential. The price of carbon credits must be 
sufficiently high to induce forestland owners to sell carbon credits, and, ideally, emitters 
who exceed their CO2 allowances will be required to purchase carbon credits from 
forestland owners. But the participation of forest landowners will be voluntary whether to 
sell or donate a perpetual conservation easement, which is a pre-requisite for sales of 
carbon credits. A national system of carbon credits may be necessary to provide capital 
for permanent forest conservation easements as well as a stream of annual income for 
timberland owners.  
Takeaway for practice: A cap-and-trade system can be a cost-effective way to lower net 
carbon emissions if it includes certifiable, tradable credits from forestland preservation 
and management, including tree planting. Also, the price of carbon must be sufficiently 
high to induce forest landowners to offer credits. To promote forest carbon sequestration, 
planners in rural areas can work with local, state, and federal governments, and non-profit 
land trusts to zone forestland at low densities, to preserve forestland through acquiring 
conservation easements, and to fashion forest management plans that ensure a long cycle 
of timber harvesting. Planners in metro areas can promote tree planting and tree retention 
ordinances to protect, expand, and manage urban forests to absorb greenhouse gases. 
Keywords: cap-and-trade, carbon sequestration, carbon credits, climate change, 
conservation easement, forest management plans   
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Introduction 
The United States is second only to China in the emission of carbon dioxide, the 
main greenhouse gas that contributes to climate change (Netherlands Environmental 
Assessment Agency, 2008). Carbon dioxide accounts for about 85 percent of total U.S. 
greenhouse gas emissions, and fossil fuels were the source of 94 percent of U.S. CO2 
emissions in 2007  (Perschel, Evans, & Summers, 2007). Consequently, much of the U.S. 
research for reducing CO2 emissions has focused on decreasing the use of fossil fuels 
(Perschel, Evans, & Summers, 2007; Pew Center for Global Climate Change, 2007; U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA), 2005, 2007). By contrast, relatively little 
research has been conducted on the potential for increasing carbon sequestration (i.e. the 
capture and storage of carbon) in U.S. forests to offset CO2 emissions.   
In 2007, U.S. forests offset more than 900 million tons or 12.7% of the nation’s 
CO2 emissions (Perschel, Evans, & Summers, 2007; USEPA, 2009). According to the 
U.S. EPA (2007), net CO2 sequestration increased by 16 percent from 1990 to 2005, 
mainly from an increase in the rate of net carbon accumulation in forests. The potential 
exists for forests to offset more CO2 emissions, with some forests able to increase their 
carbon storage by as much as 50 percent (Yardley, 2009). One government action 
recommended by Stern (2006) is to put a price on carbon through trading, such as in a 
cap-and-trade program, to encourage emitters to reduce CO2 releases. Emitters would 
each be given a CO2 emissions allowance (a cap) and if they exceeded their allowance 
they would have to purchase allowances from emitters who released less CO2 than their 
caps. Over time, the caps would be lowered to decrease CO2 emissions. A cap-and-trade 
program could include payments from emitters to owners of forestland for carbon credits 
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based on management practices that would increase carbon sequestration. And because 
forests take carbon out of the air and store it without the need for new technologies or 
major infrastructure investments, forest carbon sequestration holds promise as a cost-
effective way to achieve net reductions in CO2 emissions (Wayburn, 2009).  
This paper asks three sets of questions about the potential for increasing carbon 
sequestration in U.S. forests:  
1) What is the potential for better forest planning and management practices to 
contribute to carbon sequestration and climate change mitigation?  
2) What can be learned from the experiences with a cap-and-trade program in the 
ten Northeast states that make up the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and 
from California’s emerging experience with certified forest carbon credits? Specifically, 
how might forest planning and management practices work in terms of incentives, 
regulations to change practices, private property rights, and institutional governance to 
ensure gains in carbon sequestration?  
3) How do these changes in forest planning and management differ from the 
current forest management and land use planning programs? What are the current 
problems and future opportunities? What policies and programs will be required to make 
a forest carbon sequestration program work?  
 
The Potential for Better Forest Planning and Management Practices to 
Contribute to Carbon Sequestration and Mitigate Climate Change   
Planning for climate change features two approaches: 1) mitigating or reducing 
net carbon emissions; and 2) adapting to the effects of climate change. Planning efforts to 
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promote forest carbon sequestration primarily address the mitigation of CO2 emissions. 
Forests sequester carbon by absorbing carbon dioxide as part of the photosynthesis 
process. Trees store carbon in their wood and in the soil, and thus act as natural carbon 
sinks. An acre of trees can absorb about 10 tons of carbon dioxide a year (Little, 1997). 
But over time the amount of carbon a tree absorbs resembles a bell curve; thus older trees 
(roughly 20 to 100 years old) absorb more carbon dioxide than young trees (Gore, 2009). 
As a dead tree decays, it releases carbon into the atmosphere. Harvested trees that are 
turned into wood products release carbon more slowly than trees that die a natural death. 
Thus, forest management practices that lengthen the current timing of timber harvests and 
turn the trees into lumber can maximize the storage of carbon and minimize the rate of 
carbon release as the lumber decays. 
Forests take a long time to produce a marketable crop of lumber. During that time, 
forests are vulnerable to rising property taxes, development pressures, changes in markets 
for wood products, forest fires, and diseases and pests. These events also threaten the 
ability of forests to store carbon over the long run. In addition, climate change may 
hinder the productivity of forests, and already warmer temperatures have led to 
infestations of the mountain pine beetle which have killed more than 1.5 million acres of 
pine trees in the Rocky Mountains (Millar, Stephenson, & Stephens, 2007).   
Forests cover one-third of the United States or about 740 million acres and 68 
percent of U.S. forests (520 million acres) are classified as timberland, capable of 
producing wood products on a sustained basis. About 60 percent of all U.S. forests are 
privately owned (Daniels and Daniels, 2003; Wayburn, et al., 2007). Since 1990, U.S. 
forestlands have increased by a net of 20 million acres, even though an estimated 1.5 
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million acres of forestland have been converted to residential and commercial 
development each year (Pacific Forest Trust, 2009; U.S. EPA, 2009). If 1.5 million acres 
of forestland a year continue to be converted, this deforestation would produce nearly 20 
billion metric tons of carbon dioxide over the next 50 years (Wayburn, 2009). The 
conversion of forestland to other land uses not only releases stored carbon but also 
removes the long-term opportunity to sequester carbon in forests and wood products 
(ibid.).  Therefore, minimizing the conversion of forestlands to residential or commercial 
development is important for maximizing forest carbon sequestration.  
There are several forest management practices that can increase carbon 
sequestration (see Table 1). These management practices can increase carbon 
sequestration while still allowing the harvesting of wood products and protecting 
ecological values (Perschel, Evans, & Summers, 2007). Management practices can also 
make the forests more resilient to the effects of climate change and more resistant to 
forest fires, diseases, pests, and invasive species, thus improving the chances for 
achieving permanence in the sequestration of carbon in forests.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
There is no clear agreement on the best forest management practices for 
maximizing carbon sequestration. The Congressional Budget Office reported that   
afforestation or planting trees on land previously used for other purposes raises annual 
sequestration by the equivalent of 2.2 to 9.5 metric tons of CO2 per acre for 120 
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years (#1 and #3 in Table 1) (Birdsey, 1996; CBO, 2007). Reforestation (#2) or planting 
trees on land until recently devoted to forestry (such as severely burned land) would 
produce a slightly smaller increase in sequestration of 1.1 to 7.7 metric tons of CO2 per 
acre (Birdsey, 1996). Selecting certain tree species, lengthening the timing between 
timber harvests, and managing pests and fires can also increase sequestration from an 
estimated 2.1 to 3.1 metric tons of CO2 per acre per year (#4, #5, and #6) (Row, 1996). 
Sampson (2002) advocates planting or expanding riparian forest buffers (#3) and planting 
fast growing trees (#9) but offers no estimates of net carbon reduction. Other practices 
include processing trees into lumber and other woods products (#12), disposing of wood 
products in landfills rather than through incineration (#11), agroforestry (#8), urban 
forestry and tree planting (#10), and protecting forests through permanent conservation 
easements (#7) and forestland zoning (#13) to limit CO2 releases that would result from 
the conversion of forestlands. 
The two most expensive practices are lengthening the timber harvest rotation (#6 
and purchasing permanent conservation easements (#7). Lengthening the rotation to 
increase a forest’s natural carbon storage capacity means that it will take longer for the 
forest to generate revenue for the landowner. An actively managed forest with a harvest 
cycle of about 90 years rather than the typical commercial harvest cycles of 30 years for 
softwoods to 45 years for hardwoods is optimal for sequestering carbon (Perschel, Evans, 
& Summers, 2007; Wayburn, 2009).  
The value of a conservation easement is the difference between the fair market 
value of a property and its value restricted to forestland and open space. The conservation 
easement value of forestland generally varies inversely with the size of the land parcel. 
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Also, the more remote the parcel, the lower the easement value is likely to be. For 
instance, in 2000 the Pingree Family sold a conservation easement on 762,192 acres in 
northern Maine to the New England Forestry Foundation for slightly more than $28 
million, or just over $37 per acre (New England Forestry Foundation, 2009). Typically, 
the price per acre is low but the total price is large because of the size of the forestland 
parcel.  
Incorporating better forest management, land use planning, and conservation 
easements on forest land to increase forest carbon sequestration may be accomplished 
through a cap-and-trade program.  Ideally, owners of power plants, factories, and motor 
vehicles would be required to offset at least some of their CO2 emissions through the 
purchase of carbon credits from forestland owners.  
There are, however, several valid concerns about the reliability of carbon credits 
for forest carbon sequestration. The issues include: accuracy of measurement, 
additionality, double counting, leakage, permanence, and verifiability over time. 
Establishing protocols for forestry carbon sequestration is complicated because of the 
difficulty in identifying a beginning carbon baseline and measuring the amount of carbon 
sequestered over time, as well as measuring reductions in carbon linked to different forest 
management practices. The accuracy of measuring carbon sequestration will depend on 
developing a standardized life-cycle accounting for carbon gains and losses in forests and 
wood products (Pacific Forest Trust, 2009). 
The concept of additionality involves the question: “Would the carbon 
sequestration project have happened if the carbon credits could not have been sold?” In 
other words, the project has to provide additional carbon sequestration (Kollmuss, Zink, 
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& Polycarp, 2008). Double counting could happen from the sale of carbon credits to a 
company and then counting the credits both from the company and the forest in meeting a 
regional emissions reduction target. Leakage could occur if one forest landowner sold 
carbon credits from one forest and then any landowner accelerated timber harvesting in 
another forest. This way, the gains in carbon sequestration from the sale of credits are 
compromised by the loss of carbon sequestration somewhere else. Ultimately, net forest 
gain for a region will be the overall benchmark of the severity of leakage (Myers, 2007). 
So, if net forest gain is positive, then leakage is less of a problem than if it is negative.    
The gains in carbon sequestration must be permanent to reduce CO2 emissions 
over the long run. On the one hand, carbon gains can be lost through the destruction of 
trees from disease, insects, wild fires, and rapid timber harvesting. On the other, 
forestland can be restricted from commercial and residential development through the 
purchase or donation of conservation easements. But the sale or donation of conservation 
easements is a voluntary action by a landowner. There must be sufficient financial 
inducement for a landowner to sell or donate a conservation easement and the landowner 
must abide by the timber harvesting practices that promote carbon sequestration which 
are written into the deed of easement. In addition, the government agency or land trust 
that holds the conservation easement must monitor the forestland to verify that the 
landowner is abiding by the terms of the deed of easement and thus maintaining the 
permanence of the carbon credits (Gentry, 2009). 
 
Cap-and-Trade Programs and the Sale of Forest Carbon Credits: 
Toward Workable Programs 
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The emerging U.S. experience with cap-and-trade programs to reduce net CO2 
emissions provides insight into the institutional governance, exercise of private property 
rights, forest management practices, land use planning, and forestland preservation 
techniques that are needed to create verifiable carbon credits and an active market in 
those credits.. 
The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 cited the importance of protecting and restoring 
forests to mitigate climate change and introduced the idea of an international cap-and-
trade system for carbon credits (Wayburn, 2009). Companies, such as electrical utilities 
and manufacturers, would have a limit (cap) to how much carbon dioxide they could 
emit. If a company exceeded its limit, the company would have to purchase verifiable 
carbon credits, such as from forestland owners. A credit equals one ton of carbon dioxide 
equivalent, and each credit would offset one ton of a company’s emissions of CO2. By 
convention, the terms carbon credit and carbon offset are used interchangeably, and 
offsets can be thought of as tradable credits (California Air Resources Board (CARB), 
2009a; Stockholm Environmental Institute, 2009). The funds from the sale of carbon 
credits could be used to pay for the planting of trees, the preservation of forestlands, or 
improved forest management to offset a company’s carbon dioxide emissions. But the 
United States Senate has never ratified the Kyoto Protocol because of fears of heavy 
financial burdens on American companies. 
In 2005, ten states consisting of the six New England states along with New York, 
New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland felt they could not wait for Congress to enact a cap 
and trade program to reduce CO2 emissions, and so they created the Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative, known as RGGI or Reggie (see Figure 1). This is the nation’s first 
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mandatory regional cap-and-trade system aimed at reducing CO2 emissions. The RGGI is 
similar to the cap-and-trade system to reduce greenhouse gases called for under the 
Kyoto Protocol, and the cap-and-trade approach successfully used in the U.S. to reduce 
sulfur dioxide emissions from power plants in the 1990s (Daniels & Daniels, 2003). The 
ten Northeastern states formed RGGI, Inc., a non-profit corporation, to create, 
implement, and manage the cap-and-trade program (RGGI, 2009).  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Fossil fuel burning power plants are the single largest source of greenhouse gas 
emissions both nationwide and in the Northeast where they account for one-quarter of the 
region’s total emissions (RGGI, 2009; USEPA, 2009). The RGGI set a cap on annual 
CO2 emissions from each of the region’s 209 fossil fuel-based electric power generating 
plants. The operators of each power plant must purchase emission allowances equal to 
their annual cap. Each allowance permits a power plant operator to emit one ton of CO2. 
If a power plant’s emissions exceed the annual cap, then the operator can purchase 
emissions allowances from other power plant operators who have produced fewer 
emissions than their cap authorizes. Through RGGI, Inc., the ten states began to auction 
off emissions allowances to the operators of the power plants in 2008 (see Table 2). The 
lower prices in the latter part of 2009 and early 2010 suggest that power plant operators 
do not need to purchase as many allowances because they are reducing emissions below 
their caps and hence have less demand for allowances. The RGGI has raised more than 
half a billion dollars and established a price on carbon averaging slightly under $3 a ton 
 14 
(see Table 2). The states have already begun to use the revenues from the auctions to 
invest in energy efficiency, such as weatherizing homes, and alternative, clean energy 
technology (McCord, 2009).  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
The goals of the RGGI are modest: 1) to cap carbon dioxide emissions at 188 
million tons per year from 2009 through 2014; 2) to lower the CO2 cap by 2.5 percent 
each year from 2015 through 2018, or a total reduction of 10 percent to about 170 million 
tons a year; and 3) to reduce total regional CO2 emissions by 2.5 percent below 2008 
levels (RGGI, 2009). By comparison, the California Global Warming Solutions Act of 
2006 (AB 32), requires the state to develop markets and regulations that will cut 
California’s overall greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2020, a reduction of 
about 30 percent, and then an 80 percent reduction below 1990 levels by 2050 (CARB, 
2009b). The American Clean Energy and Security Act, (HR 2454), which passed the U.S. 
House in 2009 but has yet to become law, includes the goal of reducing the nation’s 
greenhouse gas emissions by 17 percent below 2005 levels by 2020 (Mufson, 
Fahrenhold, & Kane, 2009).    
Because the RGGI emissions cap will be lowered each year from 2015 through 
2018, tradable emissions allowances are expected to become increasingly scarce and push 
carbon prices higher. It will probably become more difficult for power plant operators to 
purchase emissions allowances from each other. Therefore, power plant operators are 
expected to become very interested in purchasing carbon offsets (credits) from owners of 
forestland.1 The RGGI has linked the anticipated rise in carbon dioxide prices to the 
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expanded use of offsets. If the price of carbon dioxide stays below $7 a ton, then offsets 
can account for only 3.3 percent of an emitter’s compliance obligation. But once the price 
of carbon dioxide reaches $7 per ton in 2005 dollars, an emitter can use offsets to satisfy 
up to five percent of the compliance obligation. And, if the price climbs to $10 per ton in 
2005 dollars, offsets can be used to satisfy 10 percent of the emitter’s obligation (RGGI, 
2009).   
So far, the RGGI has authorized tree planting, also known as afforestation, to 
qualify for the carbon offsets that power plants may purchase to reduce their overall 
carbon dioxide emissions. Afforested land must be subject to a permanent conservation 
easement, which mandates the afforested land: a) be maintained as a forest in perpetuity; 
b) sustain carbon sequestration levels reached by the end of the offset crediting period; 
and c) be managed according to sustainable forestry practices (ibid.).  
One shortcoming of RGGI’s afforestation policy is that it applies only to planting 
trees on land that has not had a forest for at least 10 years. Because forests store more 
carbon as they age, young trees add more carbon each year but overall store far less 
carbon than older trees (Birdsey, Pregitzer, & Lucier, 2006). Forests over 100 years old 
generally do not absorb much additional carbon, but they contain large stores of carbon 
(Gore, 2009). Also, the RGGI makes no distinction between afforestation projects in 
urban and non-urban areas, even though it is easier to plant large, thick stands in non-
urban settings and non-urban stands on average store roughly twice as much carbon as 
urban forests (Nowak & Crane, 2002). Another challenge and expense with afforestation 
is the need for a state agency or contracted third party to monitor the afforestation site, 
usually on an annual basis.  
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As of 2008, RGGI reported no applications for afforestation projects (Smith, 
Lazarus, Lee, Todd, & Weitz, 2009). The main reason is the price of CO2 is too low. 
According to Burgert (2008), afforestation is not attractive at prices of less than $5 a ton 
of carbon dioxide, and RGGI’s allowance auctions have produced prices averaging less 
than $3 a ton (see Table 2). The US EPA (2005) has estimated that a CO2 price of at least 
$7 a ton is needed to make it attractive for emitters to purchase forest carbon offsets and 
thus stimulate afforestation projects. The Congressional Budget Office has reported that 
if carbon dioxide prices in a cap-and-trade program began at $4.50 a ton in 2015, forest 
carbon sequestration would account for no more than five percent of annual CO2 
reductions nationwide by 2050; but if carbon prices began at $14 a ton in 2015, forest 
carbon sequestration could account for up to 20 percent of annual CO2 reductions by 
2050, second only to mitigation efforts in the energy sector (CBO, 2007). 
Three other cap-and-trade programs to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are slated 
to start in 2012 (CARB, 2009a; Western Climate Initiative, 2009; Midwestern 
Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord, 2009). These include: 1) the State of California; 2) 
the Western Climate Initiative, involving California, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, 
Utah, Washington and four Canadian provinces; and 3) the Midwestern Greenhouse Gas 
Reduction Accord made up of Iowa, Illinois, Kansas, Manitoba, Michigan, Minnesota, 
and Wisconsin.  
Each of the three proposed cap-and-trade systems allows emitters to purchase 
forest carbon sequestration credits to meet their emissions caps, but so far only California 
has actually certified forest carbon credits (Pacific Forest Trust, 2008). The two regional 
programs will accept sequestration credits from outside their regions. This policy could 
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create opportunities for forestland owners in the northeastern states who have not been 
able to sell carbon credits through the RGGI. Also, the three proposed cap-and-trade 
programs call for carbon offset projects that are “real, additional, quantifiable, permanent, 
verifiable, and enforceable” (CARB, 2009a, p. 18).  
California offers the leading example for generating credits from a forest carbon 
sequestration project. The passage of the California Global Warming Solutions Act of 
2006 (AB 32) led to the creation of Climate Action Registry Forest Sector Protocols, 
administered by the California Air Resources Board. Forestland that is registered as part 
of a forestry carbon offset project must be permanently dedicated to forest use through a 
perpetual conservation easement (CARB, 2009b; California Climate Action Registry, 
2009). Also, the forestland must promote and maintain native forests to avoid problems 
with invasive species. In addition, the forestland must be managed with natural forest 
management practices so water quality, biodiversity, and species habitat are not impaired. 
But California does allow clear-cutting of forests that participate in the carbon offsets 
program, which has not been well received by environmentalists (Bailey, 2009). A Forest 
Certification Protocol must be crafted to guide approved third party certifiers in 
conducting accurate, standardized assessments of CO2 data to ensure verifiable carbon 
sequestration and net emissions reductions. To receive certification of a particular forest, 
a landowner must identify a baseline of current carbon sequestered in that forest, trends 
for future carbon sequestration under current management practices, and additional 
carbon sequestered because of changes in management practices. 
 In 2007-8, the California Climate Action Registry completed the registration of 
two forestland preservation projects with management practices to sequester carbon. The 
 18 
2,200-acre Van Eck forest in Humboldt County, under a permanent conservation 
easement held by Pacific Forest Trust and sustainably managed, is expected to reduce 
500,000 tons of carbon over 100 years. Already, carbon offset credits from the Van Eck 
forest have been sold for more than $2 million (Bourne, 2009; Pacific Forest Trust, 
2008). And the company Green Mountain Energy through its BeGreen subsidiary is 
helping Pacific Forest Trust to market offsets from the Van Eck Forest for $19.95 per ton 
(Green Mountain Energy, 2009). This price for carbon is high enough to justify the 
carbon sequestration project, including the purchase of the conservation easement and 
forest management, and is well above the less than $3 a ton of carbon established in the 
RGGI allowance auctions.  
The Conservation Fund/Nature Conservancy’s 23,780-acre Garcia River forest in 
Mendocino County, California is a certified source of carbon credits and the sustainable 
forestry practices are expected to remove more than 77,000 tons of carbon emissions each 
year (The Conservation Fund, 2009).  
In addition to these working forest projects, in 2008, the California Climate 
Action Registry adopted an Urban Forest Project Verification Protocol to guide the 
California Air Resources Board and approved third party verifiers for verifying carbon 
sequestration from urban tree planting and maintenance (California Climate Action 
Registry, 2009). 
 
Lessons from RGGI and California 
The experiences of the RGGI and California in creating cap-and-trade programs 
and the sale of forest carbon credits point to a number of strengths and shortcomings as 
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well as land use planning implications. First, scientific studies must demonstrate that 
forests have the potential to sequester additional carbon. For instance, the forests in the 
Northeastern states sequester anywhere from 12 to 20 percent of the region’s annual CO2 
emissions, based on forestland acres, age, and species composition as well as the 
implementation of specific forest management practices (Perschel, Evans, & Summers, 
2007). But Northeastern forests have the potential to “substantially” increase carbon 
sequestration through best forest practices (ibid., p. 1). 
Second, in the absence of a federal cap-and-trade program, either a state agency 
(as in California) or a state-supported regional organization (such as RGGI) is needed to 
manage a cap-and-trade program and certify carbon credits from forests. But as yet there 
is little connection between cap-and-trade programs and land use planning and zoning. A 
major challenge to sequestering carbon is the threat of leakage from the conversion of 
forestland to other uses. For instance, from 1987 to 2002, forestland in the RGGI states 
declined by a total of 343,000 acres (Smith, Miles, Vissage, & Pugh, 2002). Over the 
next 25 years, three million acres of forestland in the Northeast are projected to be 
converted to developed uses, and release about 150 tons of CO2 per acre, or a total of 450 
million tons of CO2 (Ingerson, 2007). Without a link between land use planning and cap-
and-trade programs, leakage will cut into and possibly overwhelm gains from forest 
carbon sequestration projects.      
The local planning and zoning in the RGGI states (except for Maryland) is 
controlled by towns or townships of about 25,000 acres in size, rather than at the county 
level. As a result, planning and zoning are fragmented, and in general, the zoning on open 
land and forestland in the outer suburbs and rural parts of these states features one-acre 
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and two-acre minimum lot sizes. This zoning is ideal for ex-urban and rural residential 
development, not the protection of active forestry operations from forest fragmentation 
and conflicting non-forestry land uses (Daniels, 2006). 
In California, SB 375 of 2008 builds on AB 32 of 2006 by giving the California 
Air Resources Board the authority to set greenhouse gas reduction targets, by enabling 
the Air Resources Board to work with the state’s 18 Metropolitan Planning Organizations 
to change their regional transportation, housing, and land use plans to reduce vehicle 
miles traveled, and by providing incentives to local governments to promote more 
compact development to reduce vehicle miles traveled and hence lower CO2 emissions 
(CARB, 2010). California also has Timber Production Zones (TPZ) which exclude all 
other land uses and thus minimize the conversion of forestland to residential and 
commercial uses (Daniels & Daniels, 2003). To enroll in a TPZ, a landowner signs an 
agreement to maintain the land in forest use and receives a property tax break. If a 
landowner successfully petitions a county to remove the land from a TPZ, the land must 
be kept in forest use for another 10 years or else the landowner can pay the recaptured 
property taxes due and go through the environmental impact review process for 
immediate re-zoning (Cromwell, 1984). Forestlands in TPZs would be ideal candidates 
for permanent conservation easements and forest carbon sequestration practices.  
Third, afforestation alone is not likely to produce significant increases in forest 
carbon sequestration. Afforestation projects are estimated to have a high rate of leakage 
(US EPA, 2005). Moreover, the RGGI has overlooked the considerable opportunity for 
the use of offsets from existing forestlands and especially from forestlands already under 
conservation easements (see Table 3) to reduce CO2 emissions in the Northeastern states. 
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In northern New England, forest-related carbon offsets only for afforestation make little 
sense. Maine at 89 percent forest cover is the most heavily forested state in the nation; 
New Hampshire at 84 percent forested is the second most heavily forested state; and 
Vermont is 78 percent forested (Smith, Miles, Vissage, & Pugh, 2002). The State of 
Maine has asked RGGI, Inc. to add offsets from forest management to the list of 
acceptable offsets (Burgert, 2008). But so far, this has not happened. 
Fourth, it is critical for forest carbon sequestration projects to occur on forestland 
that is subject to a permanent conservation easement. This will ensure as much as 
possible that the forest will not be converted to residential or commercial development at 
some future date. The conservation easement must also specify the timber harvesting and 
carbon sequestration management practices. Forest carbon credits must be certified by a 
state agency or regional authority and must be verifiable, either through the monitoring of 
the conservation easements or by an outside third party. And, the credits must be 
enforceable, with penalties and restitution required for forestland owners whose 
sequestration projects do not maintain the necessary standards and management practices.  
Ideally, a cap-and-trade program would create a registry of forestlands under 
conservation easements that are potentially eligible for the sale of carbon credits. But 
because the sale or donation of conservation easements is voluntary, it uncertain how 
many forestland owners would be willing to sell or donate conservation easements and 
would then be willing to change their forest management practices to qualify for the sale 
of carbon credits.  
A review of the easements held by the major national land trusts and state land 
trusts in the Northeast indicates that there are now more than 3 million acres of forestland 
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under conservation easements, with at least 1.8 million preserved acres in Maine alone 
(see Table 3). This indicates that many forestland owners have been willing to sell 
permanent easements, a first step toward increasing forest carbon sequestration.  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Fifth, carbon prices have to be sufficiently high to induce emitters to purchase 
carbon credits from forest carbon sequestration projects, and for forestland owners to sell 
carbon credits and adopt new forest management practices.     
 Sixth, the reality that no private timber company has voluntarily sold or donated a 
conservation easement and then sold a carbon offset is not encouraging. The California 
experience suggests that non-profit land trusts do not have the financial resources or 
personnel to be arranging carbon offsets with forest owners on a broad scale. Moreover, 
the primary purpose of land trusts is land preservation, not the generation of carbon 
credits. 
Seventh, a major challenge is how to get thousands of small forestland owners to 
improve their management practices. For instance, about two-thirds of the forests in the 
Northeast are private, non-industrial forests, and there are 4.6 million acres with trees 
greater than 40 years of age that are poorly stocked or under-stocked (Smith, Miles, 
Vissage, & Pugh,  2002; Sohngen, Walker, Brown, & Grimland, 2007).  
Eighth, protecting non-urban forests should have a higher priority in a forest 
carbon sequestration program because U.S. urban forests provide about half the carbon 
storage of non-urban forests (Nowak & Crane, 2002).  
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Ninth, the U.S. Forest Service could add forest management for carbon 
sequestration to its 155 national forest plans that cover more than 190 million acres 
(Daniels & Daniels, 2003). Under the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960 and the 
National Forest Management Act of 1976, individual national forest plans are required to 
reflect a management outcome of maximum sustainable yield for a variety of uses. But as 
yet, there is no requirement that national forest plans include carbon sequestration (The 
Wilderness Society, 2009).  
 Arguably, RGGI has laid the foundation for the pending federal cap-and-trade 
legislation, which includes a national market for carbon credits from farm and forest land 
and for a federal funding stream to purchase conservation easements on these resource 
lands. But California has demonstrated how the certification of forests for the sale of 
carbon credits can actually occur.  
 
Comparing the Current Conditions and the Recommended Changes in 
Forest Planning, Preservation, and Management   
To create a road map for effective cap-and-trade programs that promote carbon 
sequestration in forests, it is important to understand the gap between the current forest 
management practices, forest land use planning, and forestland preservation regimes and 
the recommended changes in these three areas. Currently, there is considerable variety 
among state forest practices acts, state planning legislation, local planning and zoning 
regulations, and state forestland preservation efforts. The major recommended changes 
for greater forest carbon sequestration feature: 1) a large increase in the preservation of 
forestland through conservation easements to avoid the conversion of forestland and to 
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expand the area of forestland eligible for the sale of carbon credits; 2) greater use of 
forestland zoning to protect productive timberland, to discourage forestland conversion, 
and to encourage the sale of conservation easements; 3) new forest management practices 
that include lengthening timber harvest cycles and actively managing forests for a variety 
of tree ages and healthy forests; and 4) aggressive afforestation in both cities and the 
countryside.  
Forestland preservation. A cap-and-trade program aimed at promoting 
significant increases in forest carbon sequestration would require millions of acres of 
forestland under permanent conservation easements. Conservation easements are a 
powerful tool against forest fragmentation and the conversion of forestland to other land 
uses, and they have proven to be far more durable than local zoning in protecting natural 
resource lands (Daniels & Daniels, 2003; RGGI, 2009). But there would have to be major 
sources of public and private funding to purchase permanent conservation easements on 
large areas of forestland over the next few decades. 
In 1990, Congress created the Forest Legacy Program which enables the U.S. 
Forest Service to make matching grants to states to purchase forestland or, more 
commonly, conservation easements on forestlands. The Forest Service will pay up to 75 
percent of the cost of the land or conservation easements. To date, the Forest Legacy 
Program has spent more than $406 million to preserve 1.85 million acres in 42 states 
(Trust for Public Land, 2009a). In the future, the Forest Legacy Program could be linked 
to funding forestland preservation projects that will involve the sale of carbon offsets.  
State governments in Maine, Vermont, and New York have been leaders in 
purchasing conservation easements on forestland, and several land trusts—most notably 
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the Trust for Public Land, the Nature Conservancy, New England Forestry Foundation, 
and Pacific Forest Trust—have preserved a total of more than two million acres of 
forestland (Trust for Public Land, 2009a; the Nature Conservancy, 2009; New England 
Forestry Foundation, 2009; Pacific Forest Trust, 2009). But given the weak state finances 
resulting from the recession of 2008-9, state funding for forest land preservation is likely 
to be sharply reduced, at least in the short run, and non-profit funds will probably not be 
able to fill the gap. 
In 2009, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the American Clean Energy 
and Security Act of 2009 (HR 2454) which would create a cap-and-trade system for 
greenhouse gas emissions in which emitters would have to purchase carbon credits from 
each other or buy carbon credits from owners of farm or forest land (Mufson, Fahrenhold, 
& Kane, 2009). But, like the Kyoto Protocol, HR2454 has yet to pass the U.S. Senate. 
 The federal government is also debating senate bill S. 1733 that would create a 
national carbon offset market for farm and forest lands. The federal government would 
pay owners of farm and forest land for carbon reduction activities—including 
conservation easements—that might not qualify for a national offset market. The program 
would be funded through up to one percent of the carbon emission allowances sold each 
year, or up to an estimated $500 million a year, from 2012 to 2050 (The Trust for Public 
Land 2009b). Similarly, senate bill S. 2729 would pay for carbon reducing activities, 
including conservation easements, mostly on small farms and forests. 
 It is essential that forestland under a permanent conservation easement not have a 
heavy property tax burden or else few forestland owners will sell easements. Currently, 
most states offer use-value taxation for forestlands, taxing the land for property tax 
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purposes based on its value as timberland not at its “highest and best use” as potential 
residential or commercial sites. Use–value taxation is meant to support the timber 
industry and to keep the property tax burden from forcing the sale of forestland for 
development. But use-value taxation in most states does not have any specific forest 
management requirements. Therefore, forestland under a permanent conservation 
easement must have a forest management plan that will require sustainable forestry 
practices that increase carbon sequestration. 
Finally, there should be a central, publicly available data base of forestland under 
permanent conservation easements that would be eligible for the sale of carbon credits. 
For instance, there are more than 450 land trusts in the ten RGGI states and tracking 
down which land trusts hold easements on forest parcels and the size and location of 
those parcels is nearly impossible (Land Trust Alliance, 2009). A data base of 
conservation easements would be a first step in creating a registry of forests that could 
qualify for the sale of carbon offsets. For instance, starting in 2009, the State of Maine 
has required land trusts to register the conservation easements they hold with the State 
Planning Office (Maine State Planning Office, 2009).  
Forestland zoning. Forestland zoning in large minimum lot sizes and with tight 
restrictions on non-forestry land uses is important for discouraging the conversion of 
forestland to residential and commercial uses and thus minimizing leakage that could cut 
into gains from forest carbon sequestration efforts. Forestland zoning is a mandatory 
regulation that can apply to large landscapes as well as individual parcels, and ideally is 
based on a public comprehensive plan. Forestland zoning can also encourage the sale of 
conservation easements as well as hold down the cost of purchasing conservation 
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easements, as in the Pingree case in northern Maine. Currently, Oregon, California, and 
parts of New York, and Maine are known for their forestry zoning. Oregon zones 
timberland in 80-acre and 160-acre minimum lot sizes. California has Timber Protection 
Zones that forbid non-forestry uses. The Adirondack Park Agency in upstate New York 
zones most private forest land at a density of one house per 42 acres. And Maine 
designates an M-GN zone that regulates uses rather than lot sizes but allows some 
subdivisions in the Unincorporated Territory of northern Maine. However, because 26 
states have enacted compensation laws that discourage downzoning (Jacobs, 1999), it is 
unlikely that forestland zoning will soon become widespread throughout the United 
States.  
 Forest management practices. The key changes in forest management practices 
include lengthening the timing of timber harvests, managing for a variety of tree ages and 
healthy forests, and implementing an overall forest management plan aimed at promoting 
carbon sequestration that is also sensitive to the impacts on water, wildlife, and soils. 
State forest practices acts have focused on timber harvesting methods, riparian buffers, 
and timber management plans to protect the environment. But these acts have yet to 
include requirements on how to manage forests for carbon sequestration. While third 
party certification organizations, such as the Forest Stewardship Council, have promoted 
sustainably managed forests for wood production, they have not yet rated forests 
according to carbon sequestration practices. 
Forest management practices tend to differ according to who owns the forestland     
About one-third of America’s privately-held forestland is owned by just one percent of 
all forestland owners (Wayburn, 2009). These forests tend to be industrial forests, which 
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contain lumber mills or other wood processing facilities. Most owners of industrial 
forests are large timber companies, such as Weyerhaeuser and Plum Creek. These 
companies manage their land for a profit, and may look for real estate development 
opportunities on their forest holdings. A major challenge is how to encourage industrial 
forestland owners to lengthen current harvest cycles. But as of early 2010, no large 
timber company had sold carbon credits in a cap-and-trade program.  
A majority of private forest land consists of non-industrial forests without any 
wood processing facilities on the property. The motivations for owning non-industrial 
forestland may include a rural lifestyle, aesthetics, recreation opportunities, wildlife 
habitat, a real estate investment, or harvesting timber or firewood. Many non-industrial 
forests are not well-managed or do not have a forest management plan (Perschel, Evans, 
& Summers, 2007). Some timber owners use harvesting practices such as high-grading 
(harvesting only the largest and most valuable trees) and simple overcutting, also known 
as liquidation cuts, that result in understocked forest stands with less ability to absorb 
carbon than well-managed forests (Sohngen, Walker, Brown, & Grimland, 2007). The 
challenge here is how to induce non-industrial forest owners to actively manage their 
woodlands for increased carbon sequestration. 
Promoting tree planting. Tree planting on open land or to replace harvested 
timber can be an important part of increasing forest carbon sequestration. Tree planting in 
rural areas is likely to be more effective in sequestering carbon because thicker stands can 
be planted and there is usually less exposure to pollution and vandalism. In urban areas, 
subdivision regulations can require the retention of trees of a certain size, the replacement 
of trees removed during construction, and the planting of trees, either on 
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environmentally-sensitive lands or to create buffers between properties. For instance, a 
number of counties in Maryland have effective forest conservation ordinances (Daniels & 
Daniels, 2003), and New York City in its PlaNYC (2008) established a goal to plant one 
million trees as part of its target to reduce carbon emissions by 30 percent between 2005 
and 2030.   
Considerable uncertainty exists about the likelihood of success of forest carbon 
sequestration efforts because of the gaps between current and recommended forest 
practices, land use planning, and forest preservation programs. Part of the reason is a lack 
of strong forestland zoning to minimize the conversion of forestland which may result in 
carbon leakage. Two big unknowns are the amount of future funding from state and 
federal agencies and private land trusts to purchase conservation easements, and the price 
emitters will be willing to pay for carbon credits. Also, it is uncertain how many 
forestland owners will want to voluntarily sell or donate permanent conservation 
easements, and then be willing to change their management practices, such as 
lengthening the timing of harvests, to maximize carbon storage in trees. 
                     
Conclusions 
U.S. forests have the potential to sequester large amounts of carbon, and currently offset 
almost 13 percent of total U.S. carbon dioxide emissions (Perschel, Evans, & Summers, 
2007; USEPA, 2009). So far, efforts to devise and implement effective forest 
management practices and forestland planning and preservation strategies for carbon 
sequestration are in their infancy. The Northeastern states have established a regional 
cap-and-trade program, RGGI, to reduce CO2 emissions from power plants, but its 
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afforestation offsets element has not worked at all. A key problem is the carbon price is 
too low to induce emitters to buy carbon credits for afforestation.   
Carbon markets have begun to enable carbon dioxide emitters to pay forestland 
owners to store carbon in trees and soil, as demonstrated in California. But the price of 
carbon will probably have to exceed $7 or more a ton and ideally will need to reach $14 a 
ton in order to induce emitters to purchase a significant number of carbon credits and to 
compel forestland owners to offer to sell large amounts of credits. But to achieve a high 
level of credit sales, there will need to be major long-term funding sources to purchase 
conservation easements on millions of acres of forestland, along with more professional 
foresters to draft forest management plans, especially for non-industrial forests.  
A major obstacle to ensuring net gains from forest carbon sequestration credits is 
the fact that forestland zoning is not widely used in the United States. Thus, even if some 
forestland is preserved and generates carbon credits, other forests will be converted to 
residential and commercial uses thus reducing the net storage of carbon. Another obstacle 
that has kept forestland owners from selling carbon credits is the lengthening of the 
timing of timber harvests that would be required to maximize carbon storage in trees. A 
national cap-and-trade system with carbon credits from forests is under debate in 
Congress and could provide capital for permanent forest conservation easements as well 
as a stream of annual income for timber companies and other forest landowners to 
compensate them for the longer harvesting cycles.  
Planners can promote net forest carbon sequestration by working with cities and 
suburbs to adopt comprehensive plans that designate urban and suburban infill areas for 
new development along with afforestation projects and tree retention ordinances. In rural 
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areas, planners can try to promote restrictive forestland zoning to minimize the 
conversion of forestlands to other uses and thus minimize leakage from forest carbon 
sequestration projects. Collaborative planning and funding for conservation easements 
between government agencies and private land trusts will be important for limiting 
forestland conversion, establishing eligible forestlands for generating carbon credits in 
cap-and-trade programs, and monitoring forestlands to verify that carbon sequestration 
gains are occurring. 
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Table 1. Forest Practices to Increase Carbon Sequestration 
 
1. Planting trees on agricultural land. 
2. Replanting trees on harvested or burned forestland. 
3. Planting or expanding riparian forest buffers. 
4. Modifying forest management practices to emphasize carbon storage, such as selective 
cutting and thinning of trees, maintaining stands of uneven aged trees, maintaining 
stocking of trees per acre, and maintaining species diversity in forests because the effects 
of climate change on any one species are uncertain (Linder, 2000).  
5. Low-impact harvesting methods to decrease damage to soils and trees, and minimize 
carbon release, such as avoiding clear-cutting. 
6. Lengthening the timber harvest rotation by more than five years and up to 40 years. 
7. Preserving forestland from conversion to other land uses through permanent 
conservation easements. 
8. Agro-forestry practices that combine the production of trees along with the production 
of crops and/or livestock. 
9. Establishing of short-rotation woody biomass plantations, such as fast growing poplar. 
10. Urban forestry: growth of trees and planting trees. 
11. Disposing of wood products in landfills rather than through incineration; landfills 
significantly retard the decay of wood and release of carbon. 
12. Producing structural lumber and furniture woods, which release carbon much more 
slowly than rather than paper or cardboard (Skog & Nicholson, 1998). 
13. Protecting forestlands through forestland zoning. 
Source: see, Stavins & Richards, 2005. 
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Table 2. Auctions of Carbon Dioxide Emission Allowances by RGGI, 2008-2010. 
Year                  Number of                Price Per Ton of                  Total Revenue 
of Sale              Allowances              Carbon Dioxide                 
2008                12,565,387                       $3.07                             $38,575,738 
2008                31,505,898                       $3.38                           $106,489,930 
2009                31,513,765                       $3.51                           $110,613,310 
2009                 2,175,513 (for 2012)       $3.05                               $6,635,315 
2009                30,800,000                       $3.23                             $99,484,000 
2009                  2,170,000 (for 2012)      $2.06                               $4,470,200 
2009                28,408,945                       $2.19                             $62,215,589 
2009                  2,172,540 (for 2012)      $1.87                               $4,062,650 
2009                28,591,698                       $2.05                             $58,612,980 
2009                 1,599,000 (for 2012)      $1.86                                $2,974,140 
2010               40,612,408                       $2.07                              $84,067,684                       
2010                 2,137,992 (for 2012)      $1.86                                $3,976,665 
TOTAL        214,153,146                       $2.72                            $582,178,201                                    
 
Note: An allowance is the right to emit one ton of carbon dioxide. 
Source: Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative http://www.rggi.org/co2-auctions/results  
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Table 3. Total Land Area, Forested Acreage, Public Forest Acreage, and Forest Acreage 
under a Conservation Easement in the Ten States in the Northeastern United States. 
                                   Total             Total            Forest Acreage    Forest Acreage       
                                   Land              Forested         in Public           Under a  
 State                          Area              Acreage        Ownership          Conservation Easement 
Connecticut              3,101,000      1,859,000           315,000                      8,347 
Delaware                  1,251,000         383,000             32,000                      1,684 
Maine                     19,753,000    17,699,000           970,000               1,829,300 
Maryland                  6,295,000     2,566,000            609,000                      1,247 
Massachusetts          5,016,000     3,126,000            743,000                      9,200 
New Hampshire       5,740,000     4,818,000         1,088,000                  416,000 
New Jersey              4,748,000      2,132,000            810,000                      5,413 
New York              30,223,000    18,432,000         3,977,000                  842,000 
Rhode Island              668,000         385,000              95,000                      1,690 
Vermont                  5,920,000      4,618,000            754,000                  199,938 
TOTAL                 82,715,000    56,018,000         9,392,000               3,314,819  
 
Sources: Smith et al., 2002; Forest Society of Maine, New England Forestry Foundation, 
Society for the Protection of New Hampshire Forests, The Nature Conservancy, U.S. 
Forest Service Forest Legacy Program, Vermont Land Trust. 
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Figure 1. States Participating in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 43 
Notes: 
                                                 
1 RGGI allows four types of carbon offsets in addition to afforestation. These include: 
Landfill methane capture and destruction; reduction in emissions of sulfur hexafluoride 
(SF6) in the electric power sector; reduction or avoidance of CO2 emissions from natural 
gas, oil, or propane end-use combustion due to end-use energy efficiency in the building 
sector; and avoided methane emissions from agricultural manure management operations, 
(see, www.rggi.org). 
